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Ghana-Togo Boundary: (past and present)

By Dr. Hanes Walton, Jr.

Background to the Togoland Problem

One of the striking differences between Leagues of Nations Mandates systems and the U.N. Trusteeship system is that while the former was mainly interested in "just treatment" of the dependent people involved, the latter has been concerned with "their progressive development towards government or independence." This shift of emphasis has been mostly evidenced in the case of the two Togolands under United Kingdom and French Trusteeships.¹ The Togolands have not commanded the international spotlight because of their size or international importance. They were among the smaller of the eleven areas under the trusteeship, and they are geographically rather far removed from any direct involvement in the "cold war." Basically then, the Togoland Problem is the result of the accelerated effort to apply the abstract ideal of self-determination to a complex milieu in which the criteria for identifying "self" are indeterminate, unstable, or subject to easy manipulation.

In 1884, the Germans concluding a treaty which represented the first formal move to create a German African empire, established a German protectorate over a small coastal enclave (Togo, meaning "behind the sea")—no more than fifteen miles wide and three miles deep. This embodied its hinterland. Final boundary delimitations with the British, in regard to Ghomeyast and with the French, in regard to Dahomey, were not made until 1897 and 1899 respectively. As German administration was terminated in 1914, this means that Togoland existed for only fifteen years as a separate political unit.² Historically, this is the measure of unity possessed by the peoples of modern Togo.

Despite the brevity of the German presence, however, it was not insignificant. Their presence provoked that tenuous sense of unity imposed by all imperial powers upon colonial people under their control. After World War I, with the defeat of Germany, the country was partitioned into British and French spheres by an arbitrary north-south line, with Lome and most of the rail lines in the British sphere. On July 10, 1919, a final Anglo-French agreement was signed in Paris in accordance with which the British withdrew westward, leaving Lome, the rail lines, one third of the Ewe and nearly two-thirds of Togoland under French control.³ Three years later, the British and the French mandates were confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations. During the ensuing seventeen years, the two mandates were administered

¹G. M. Carter (ed.) *Politics in Africa* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc., 1966), p. 35-88.

²*Ibid.*, p. 5.

³F. M. Bourett, *The Gold Coast* (California: Hoover Library Publications, Stanford University Press, 1949), p. 100.

under the supervision of the League of Nations Mandate Commission—British Togoland as an integral part of the Gold Coast Colony and Dependencies, and French Togoland as a separate dependency under the direct control of the French Minister of Colonies.

When the League became defunct, the future of the Togoland Mandates became dubious. This uncertainty was removed by the declaration of intent by the British and the French delegates at a meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations in January, 1946. According to this declaration, the two governments undertook to draw trusteeship agreements for the two territories and to place them under the United Nations Trusteeship system.⁴ The following December these agreements were approved by the General Assembly. During the following nine years the "Togoland Problem" has emerged as one of the most intractable and persistent questions the United Nations has been called to resolve. The tenth General Assembly, however, took a major step towards a solution by its decision to supervise a plebiscite in British Togoland. This plebiscite was held in May, 1956, and the results and implications follow.

During the period 1885-1900, when boundaries of Togoland were laid down, no conscious effort was made to have them coincide with those of ethnic groups. The Dagomba State in Northern Togoland was split down the middle—the capital Yendi and half the state falling within (German) Togoland, the other half in the northern territories of the (British) Gold Coast. The Ewes were also split approximately in half.⁵ Other groups such as Kusasi, Adja-Onatchi, Ana and Fon were also bifurcated by the creation of the German Togoland. In the final delimitation of the then boundary between British and French Togolands, somewhat greater respect was shown for the ethnic boundaries. In 1919, the Boundary Commissioners were directed to avoid separating villages from their agricultural lands. The Franco-British Declaration of that year further stipulated that inhabitants living on either side of the frontier would be permitted, if they declared their intention within six months of the boundary delimitations, to move with their property to the sphere (French or British) of their choice. The peoples of the Dagomba state were reunited under one administration, as were the Gourma, Kusasi and others. The case of the Ewe is quite different. During the war years, 1914-1919, most of Eweland was under British administration. The British westward withdrawal in 1919 from what was roughly the eastern boundary of Eweland to the present boundary of British Togoland meant not merely that the Ewe in French Togoland were obliged to learn their third European language, but also that Ewe groups not previously divided, found themselves straddling a new international boundary. The drive for Ewe unification reflected, at least partially, a desire to return to the brief five years of unity under the British.

⁴Coleman, *op. cit.*

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 46.

Another factor is that the emergence of political systems tended to be co-terminous with the arbitrary boundaries carved out by the colonial powers on an arbitrary north-south axis. The ethnic compositions of the two Togolands reflected this division, which explains in part the sharp and persistent cleavage between north and south in the two territories.⁶

Peoples of the Togolands

The northern and southern sections of the Togolands can be characterized by three criteria, namely:

- a. Traditional forms of socio-political organizations;
- b. Degree of Western acculturation;
- c. Level of economic development.

The northern sections of both Togolands have larger political organizations, much centralized and hierachial than the southern sections. On the British side, for example, the majority of people belong to Mamponsi, Dagomba or Gonja States, which existed long before the arrival of the British. Similarly, on the French side, one finds the Cotochi, Bassari, Kon-Komba, Losso and others, ruled by Superior Chiefs, who had traditionally exercised considerable authority. Moreover, both Administering Authorities (British more than the French) have endeavored to preserve the integrity of such pre-existing systems by minimizing disruptive influence and by supporting and ruling through the traditional authorities.

By contrast, in the Southern section the groups have been much more loosely organized in political systems—marked by considerable decentralization and dispersion of authority. Among the Ewe for example, the Sub-tribe (numbering a few hundred to 20,000) was the widest independent political unit, and there were about 120 such groups at the turn of the century. Moreover, the political structure was conciliar and somewhat democratic. These differing traditional patterns, coupled with the different policies, the Administering Authorities were able or inclined to pursue, have significantly influenced the degree to which the peoples of the respective sections have been predisposed towards and have become involved in modern types of political activities.⁷

Involvement in such activity has been more pronounced in the Southern section than in the Northern, because there is an absence of traditional chiefs, moreover, the elites are fearful of any challenge to their power and to the status quo of political modernists. There is the fact that Western acculturation carried first by the trader and missionary, then by the government agent was most effective at the coast; only recently has there been any penetration into the north. The third criterion is economic development. In the north, economy has been

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷Togoland Report. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Offices.

overwhelmingly based upon subsistent agriculture, whereas in the cocoa and palm-oil areas in the south there has been a comparatively high degree of commercialization. This has resulted in the creation of a middle class composed of farmers and traders economically active and deeply concerned over political processes and the resultant impact on economic arrangements. These sectional differences in the degree of Westernization and economic development have operated to sharpen the traditional culture cleavage between the Northern and Southern people. The central fact, though, is the basic distrust and fear of the less developed northern leaders and the peoples regarding the pretensions and ambitions of the politically more articulate and ambitious Southerners.

British Administration

Historically, the British ruled Togoland as an integral part of the Gold Coast since 1919. In 1956, when the Gold Coast was preparing for independence, the British iterated their stand to incorporate Togo in Gold Coast for independence.⁸ The reasons for that gesture are obvious. First, Togo could benefit from an association with the self-governing Gold Coast; and also the idea of larger scale units of human organization in the modern world was subscribed to by the British. Certainly any such association could help the Gold Coast as well; particularly with regard to VRP. While integration was not absolutely essential to the Volta River Project, it would enhance effective management. Perhaps the most convincing argument was the lack of a persuasive case for any of the alternatives to integration.

Secondly, Togo could not be an able independent unit. Coupled with this were doubts about popular support to any of the alternatives to integration. The British were not altogether unselfish for they were also concerned about maintaining effective support with the African leadership of the Convention People's Party; besides, Togoland was never administered as an entity.

Thirdly, there was a complete integration of the peoples of the Gold Coast and British Togoland at the local level (in local governments), but unfortunately, less integration at the central government level.

French Administration

In contrast, the French Government maintained administrative and territorial integrity of the French Sphere of Togoland. Because of its larger size of population, possession of Port of Lome, internal rail lines, and greater potentialities as a viable economic unit, it was easier to administer as a separate entity.⁹ The French assimilationist policy—i.e., French Union, made this a different political destiny from the British. There was disruption of traditional authorities, hence French direct rule, and ultimate legislative and executive authorities rested in the French government in Paris.

⁸Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 101.

The French policy since 1945 was directed towards guiding developments and creating situations in Togoland which would result in continued close association of Togoland with the French Union. Therefore, for obvious reasons of state a policy was designed to ward off such alternatives as Ewe or Togoland unification, or integration with the Gold Coast or complete independence.

Political Associations in the Togolands

For purposes of analysis, these can be classified under three broad headings according to their various positions on the issue of the political future of the two Togolands; namely UNIFICATIONISTS—unification of the Togolands, either as a step toward unification with the Gold Coast or step toward independence of a united Togoland State. UNIONISTS—Association of French Togoland with French Union. These included chiefs and factions who had otherwise benefited from the French rule, and INTEGRATIONIST, associations which advocated the complete and permanent integration of British Togoland with an independent Gold Coast. All of the unificationists and PTP were of the Ewe leadership. For example, the following personalities were all Ewes:

A. M. Simpson	A.E.C.
S. G. Antor	T.C.
Sylvanus Olympio	CUT
E. K. Essien	JUVENTO
Pedro Olympio	MPT
K. A. Gbedemah	C.P.P.
Dan Chapman	Founder of A.E.C.

*Category and Title	Abbreviations	Date Formed	Area of Activity
UNIFICATIONISTS			
All-Ewe Conference	A.E.C.	1945	So. G.C.
Togol and Congress	T.C.	1943	So. Br. Togo
Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise	JUVENTO	1951	So. Fr. Togo
Comite de l'Unite Togolaise	C.U.T.	1939	So. Fr. Togo
Mouvement Populaire Togolaise	M.P.T.	1954	So. Fr. Togo
UNIONIST			
Parti Togolaise du Progres	P.T.P.	1946	So. Fr. Togo
Union des Chefs et des	U.C.PN	1951	No. Fr. Togo
INTEGRATIONIST			
Convention People's Party	C.P.P.	1949	G.C. Br. Togo
Northern People's Party	N.P.P.	1954	No. Br. Togo

*James S. Coleman, Togoland, September, 1956, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The Ewe constituted 21% of the population of the two Togolands, Thirty-three per cent of the British Togoland and 16% of the French Togoland.¹⁰ The differing aspirations and activities of the various Ewe groups give some substance to the popular notion that the Ewe and Togoland problems are synonymous. Most Ewes have tended to assume such to be the case.

The Togolands and the U.N.

The Ewe question in particular and unification sentiments in general prompted the investigation of the Visiting Missions. The first Mission reported among other things that "a memorandum was also presented by the Anfoega branch of the 'Dyanamic CPP' and it was obvious from the flags and posters displayed in the area that supporters of the CPP were in a large majority there." The Second Mission concluded "a formal consultation with the people will be necessary to decide the question" and "a plebiscite would be the most democratic, direct and specific method of ascertaining the true wishes of the people."¹¹ On the issue of unification vs. integration, the Trusteeship Council displayed a certain ambivalent attitude.

For instance, between 1947 and 1954, the United Nations and the Administering Authorities were in general committed to a policy of furthering the development of pan-Togoland institutions. The anti-unificationist groups (CPP in British Togoland, PTP and VCPN in French Togo) became very strong. In short, developments in the two Togolands during and after 1952 made it possible for the administering Authorities to resist, on grounds of substantial Togolese opposition, any further development of common Togoland institutions.¹²

The Plebiscite and After

In the plebiscite held in British Togoland on May 9, 1956, a majority of the registered voters (58%) voted in favor of union with an independent Gold Coast. Accordingly, in a memorandum submitted to the Trusteeship Council on July 13, 1956, the government of the United Kingdom proposed that Trusteeship Council and General Assembly request the Administering Authorities to prepare and terminate the trusteeship agreement and for the union of the Territory with the Gold Coast as soon as the latter became independent. So in agreement with this on March 6, 1957, British Togoland became part and parcel of the new State of Ghana. French Togoland has since July 1960 become a sovereign state of the new Togo, and a member of the French Union.

¹⁰*International Conciliation*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (September, 1956).

¹¹Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (September, 1956).

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 126.

Critique and Speculation About the Future of Togo Republic and Ghana

The new questions are: (1) is the urge for Ewe unification over? and more importantly (2) will Ghana ever make an attempt to include the Togolands? One of the Togo's most serious problems concerns the Ewes, an important tribe numbering less than two million. Some 200,000 of them live in Togo.¹³ And the nature of the problem can be seen in the exchange of notes between Ghana and Togo years after Togo's independence. This note emphasized the persistent desire of Ghana for unification with Togo. There was a formal complaint by Ghana, alleging attempts on the life of the President of Ghana, in Kulungugu by the people using Togolese Soil "for the purpose of planning and carrying out outrage."¹⁴ Even here, an occasion was sought by the African Affairs Secretariat, to reiterate Ghana's stand on the unification of Togo with it in these words:

The artificial division of the peoples of Ghana and Jogu, brought about as part of a settlement between the Great Powers after the First World War, in total disregard of the wishes of the inhabitants of the territories concerned. . . . The Government of Ghana does not contest the right of either Ghanaians who are in Togo or of Togo citizens who are in Ghana, to join in such discussions and to make proposals as to the means by which the artificial division between the two countries can be ended. On the contrary, the Government of Ghana believed that a solution of this problem can only be secured through the active and open participation of leaders of opinion and political figures of both countries.¹⁵

There is no doubt that the artificial boundary referred to here has special reference to the Ewe people, who populate both Togolands.

More recently, after an abortive coup in November last, President Grunitzky accused the Comite de l'Unite Togolaise (C.U.T.) party of the late President Olympio—of having organized the affair, and described them as "enemies of reconciliation and national unity." On a broader front C.U.T. charged the Grunitzky government with neglecting the interest of the Ewe people in the South, and in particular with failure to pursue cultural, economic, and other links with Ghana, where the majority of the Ewes now live. They accused the government of a lack of dynamism in its internal economic policies, and of extravagance, of over-dependence on French aid and of seeking to close links with OCAM group of states led by the Ivory Coast.¹⁶

¹³Lewis N. Alexander, *World Political Patterns*, Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, pp. 409-410.

¹⁴Exchange of notes between Governments of Ghana and Togo—December 7, 1962.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶*West Africa*, No. 2582, November 26, 1966, p. 1347.

There is some truth in all these charges, but they over-simplified the problems. Grunitzky appears to have genuinely tried to get a representative cabinet, but he lacked a popular base. On the economic side, there is little anyone can do, for Togo is a poor country that exports cocoa, coffee, ground nuts, cotton and palm products, all in small quantities. The budget leaves no room for locally financed development, and so recourse to aid is absolutely essential. There has been in fact little development in the past three years despite a five-year development plan.

Even the current military regime of Ghana seems to be figuring prestigiously in Togo. At a demonstration after the attempted coup, various bizarre rumors were circulated among them that General Kotoka and Colonel Afrifa, the architects of the Ghana coup, who happened to be in Togo on a visit over the crisis week-end, had been brought to supervise the army's coming to power in Lome.¹⁷ In fact, it was perfectly clear that expert advice in coup-making was what was lacking and Kotoka and Afrifa may well have felt a sense of superiority, seeing what bad planning could do. It says much for the public disturbance that, although a Government reception had to be cancelled, the two Ghanaians did not leave for home until the appointed time.

On January 13 of this year, barely two weeks after Grunitzky reshuffled his cabinet, which axed a number of people, including Antoine Meachi, a new and successful coup was conducted by the army, led by Lt. Colonel Eyadema.¹⁸ Some suggest that the reason for the downfall of Grunitzky was that he lacked credibility. He was brought in by the army as a compromise candidate to paper the cracks of national unity, and when it seemed that he no longer could do this, he was discarded. Thus, when the peoples of Lome took to the street on November 21 to show their dislike to their government and their Unite Togolaise (U.T.) sympathies, they dealt it a mortal blow. About mid-day of the day of the coup, many people carried placards saying "Long Live African Unity," "North or South," "We Are All Brothers" and only one said "Down with Grunitzky."¹⁹

In the light of the present developments, it would not be unreasonable to assume the following, that:

1. The people, more so, and to a lesser degree the politicians, are realizing the practicality of unification overtures—the advantages of mutual benefits;
2. That this realization would become even more clear as the years go by, and political maturity becomes established;
3. And then any future gestures of this kind would not be totally acknowledged as the politicians wish, but the people's wishes. Such integration feelers might come from either Ghana or Togo. Ghana has used the Ewe question, more than once in the past, as a basis for Togo to merge with it, and it would be a surprise if she didn't use it again.

¹⁷*West Africa*, No. 2583, January 21, 1967, p. 71.

¹⁸*West Africa*, No. 2590, January 21, p. 71.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 94.

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NATO's Approach To Multilateral Control of Nuclear Weapons

By H. Walton, Jr.

Theoretically speaking, statesmen must not tie their own hands; they must not cut off their alternatives; they must retain the capacity to adapt their policy to the unique contingencies of the moment. However, in practice, statesmen tend to combine these approaches, generally giving priority to the free hand rather than the clear line. The men who bear the responsibility for conducting the foreign relations of states tend to regard their business as a pragmatic endeavor, requiring careful attention to cases rather than doctrinaire application of a formula.¹ In some instances, they appear to believe that it is possible simultaneously to state firm commitments and remain uncommitted; American adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty, for example, was presented as an act which clearly told of the Soviet attack upon Western Europe.²

Therefore, many of the alliance commitments which the United States has undertaken since 1945 may be regarded as line-drawing operations in the sense that their primary function is to put the Communist powers on notice that aggression against specific states will be resisted by the United States.³ As Helmut Von Moltke argues, an alliance never really achieves what is militarily desirable; individual allies extend themselves only if and when they think they can gain a political advantage. Then commitments to systematic involvement in world affairs require that the United States accept an active role either in the alliance patterns of the balance of power system, collective security system, or in a system of world government, if only to gain a political advantage over her foe. Since Claude states in his book, *Power and International Relations*, that no system of world government prevails, nor a system of collective security but a system more or less of balance of power still prevails. Hence, if we adopt Mr. Von Moltke's argument, that allies extend themselves only to achieve a political advantage, we can see that NATO has been struggling since its formation in 1949 to become an exception to this proposition.

Therefore, the United States has attempted to solve her main problem in international relations—(i.e., how to cope with the dynamics of Soviet expansionism since the war) by resorting to a general system of collective defenses,⁴ in which no system of central control is present above the military command. America's alliance policy in the Cold War has been one of collective defenses instead of collective security

¹Inis Claude, *Power & International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 201.

²A. Vandenberg, *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), p. 478-479.

³Claude, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

⁴Arnold Wolfers, ed., *Alliance Policy in the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959), p. 49-74.

or world government because it does not limit the freedom of the state to maneuver in the pursuit of its objectives as the collective security principle does. As a result, there remains only the balance of power system, which can accord such autonomous maneuvers. The balance of power system involves alliances which are essentially externally-oriented groupings, designed to organize cooperative action among their members for the purpose of dealing with conflict situations posed by states or groups of states on the outside.⁵ Balance of power postulates two or more worlds in jealous confrontation, while collective security postulates one world, organized for the cooperative maintenance of order within its bounds.⁶

However, a major factor in any alliance, especially one that operates in the framework or has a framework of a balance of power system, is the political, military, and economic situation of each of the alliance members. The greater the stability, politically and economically, and the stronger it is militarily, the better are its chances for leadership and for dictating policy to other members of the alliance that are weaker and less stable. In a case where all the members except one are inferior, the greater are the chances that they will have to go along with a policy which is dictated by the one superior power. But as time moves along and some of the members gain some sort of equality with the leading one, conflict arises around *the most dictated policy*, the one which had been, before equality, left to the choice of the superior member. These assertions are the secondary thesis of the paper. The primary thesis is that NATO's approach to multilateral control of nuclear weapons did not exist prior to *evening the gap* between the superior member and the more or less inferior members of NATO. Up until the present time the nuclear policy has been controlled solely by the United States. Now, since more and more European countries have gained equality within the alliance, the greater their demand has been for a voice in the policy of control.

NATO is an alliance against an aggressor or any combination of aggressors. It is an alliance not for war but for peace.⁷ NATO is the prime example of "an alliance forced by twentieth century conditions to become an international organization,"⁸ an instrument of the balance of power system which has been modernized by the adoption of the form and techniques of international institutions.⁹ The NATO alliance owes its creation to a series of Communist aggressive actions after World War II—in Eastern Europe, Azerbaijan, Greece, Turkey, Czechoslovakia and Berlin.¹⁰ These events forced Western Europe and the United States to recognize, first, that Communist tactics for gaining world-wide hegemony extend beyond political and economic measures

⁵Claude, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷Ben Moore, *NATO and the Future of Europe* (New York: Harper, 1958), p. 115.

⁸Ruth Lawson, "Concerning Policies in the North Atlantic Community," *International Organization* XII (Spring, 1958), p. 164.

⁹Claude, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

¹⁰A. Buchan, *NATO in the 1960's* (New York: Praeger, 1960).

and, second, that Western interests could not be assured without military forces capable of deterring Communist takeover attempts.

These two factors led to a common realization of the NATO concept of a collective military defense for its members and their territories. NATO, like any other alliance, involves a complex of historical, political, psychological, economic, and military factors. Thus, it suffers when these factors are not in harmony. Yet, during the period when the heart of NATO's defenses rested on the commitment of United States military power, Alliance strategy, forces and resource commitments had the simplicity of a relatively single focus. Today, this focus has become more diffused. The remarkable growth in Western Europe's economic, political, and military strength has shifted relationships among its members and, in recent years, the Atlantic Alliance has seemed to become considerably more vulnerable to the infirmities noted by Von Moltke.

Since the end of World War II an important change has taken place in the nature of alliances. In the past, alliances have been created for three basic reasons: (1) to provide an accretion of power, (2) to leave no doubt about the alignment of forces, (3) to provide an incentive for mutual assistance beyond that already supplied by an estimate of the national interest. There was some inconsistency among these requirements, to be sure, even before the advent of nuclear weapons. The desire to leave no doubt about the collective motivation of the states occasionally conflicted with the attempt to combine the maximum number of states for joint action.¹¹ The wider the system of collective action or defense, the more varied were the motives animating it and the more difficult the task of obtaining common action proved to be. Then, the inevitable conclusion is that not everybody joined the alliance for the same things. Therefore, the greater the number entering the alliance, the more intense and direct has to be the threat which would produce joint action.

This traditional difficulty has been compounded in the nuclear age. The requirements for tight command and control of nuclear weapons are to some degree inconsistent with a coalition of sovereign states.¹² The enormous risks of nuclear warfare affect the credibility of traditional pledges of mutual assistance. In short, the destructiveness and range of modern weapons have a tendency to produce both extreme nationalism and neutralism.¹³ As a result, Europeans feel that sharing in nuclear control is the mark of first-class status. With regard to this emphasis, the nuclear issue has become a sort of touchstone in the relations between the United States and the European members of NATO. The European governments have sought to raise their participation in the control of a nuclear deterrent force. To make the discus-

¹¹Henry Kissinger, "Coalition Diplomacy In A Nuclear Age: *The Atlantic Community II* (Fall, 1964), p. 431.

¹²Theo Summer, "For An Atlantic Future." *Foreign Affairs*, XLIII (October, 1964), p. 113.

¹³Livingston Hartley, "Atlantic Partnership—How?," *Orbis*, VIII (Spring, 1964). p. 141.

sion of this topic more beneficial, let us first start with the nature and composition of the Alliance itself.

The next general premise is the most fundamental. Political policy must always be the master of military strategy. This is the first principle to be applied in a consideration of defense policy. Defense and foreign policies are inextricably interwoven: the two can be considered separately but it is impossible to divorce the one from the other. It is a truism to say that the best defense policy a country can have is a good foreign policy, but the logical consequences of the truism are rarely appreciated. A unilateral foreign policy is a contradiction in terms and is no more tenable than a unilateral defense policy.¹⁴ Since today no country can, alone, provide for its defense, the doctrine of interdependence has come into being. A communique issued after talks between the British Prime Minister in October, 1957, and President Eisenhower states this doctrine of interdependence:

The arrangements which the nations of the free world have made for collective defense and mutual help are based on the recognition that the concept of national self-sufficiency is outdated. The countries of the free world are interdependent, and only in genuine partnership, by combining their resources and sharing tasks in many fields, can progress and safety be found. For our part, we have agreed that our two countries will henceforth act in accordance with this principle.¹⁵

Obviously the implications of interdependence extend more widely than defense arrangements and must include political co-ordination, which, even with the military subordinated to the political, is highly necessary. The advent of nuclear weapons has pointed up the grim truth of Clemenceau's dictum that war is too serious a matter for generals alone. Obviously, expert military advice must provide the basis for an intelligent defense policy. But unless the essential point that the purely military view is only one aspect of defense in its widest sense is grasped, then problems cannot be seen in their right perspective. The vastly accelerated pace of modern war means that decisions of vital consequence may have to be taken in a matter of minutes and it is imperative that the responsibility for these decisions rest squarely on political shoulders. Captain B. H. Linddell Hart has this to say:

Statesmanship, in the H-bomb age, must control not only the aims but the operations. It should direct military defense planning and the formulation of military doctrine. Hence statesmen and their diplomatic advisers must have a greater knowledge of military technique than they needed in the past. That is as important as for soldiers to submit to political direction.¹⁶

¹⁴F. O. Miksche, "The Nuclear Deterrent and Western Strategy," *Orbis*, VIII (Summer, 1964), p. 231.

¹⁵NATO: Meeting of Heads of Government, Paris, Text of Statements, December 1957, Dept. of State Publication No. 6606.

¹⁶B. H. L. Hart, *Deterrent or Defense* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 3.

President Kennedy, also, commented that:

Political planning must be aware of military realities, and military plans in turn must be responsive to political considerations . . . Our force goals, our military policy, our deployments and our war plans themselves must all reflect the purposes and spirit of our great community. Military and political problems are not separable, and military and political men must work ever more closely together.¹⁷

Hence, with the idea of interdependence and political co-ordination in mind, one can therefore begin to see part of the nature of the alliance itself. Already before the NATO Treaty, there had been a renewal of some old alliances. In March, 1947, Britain and France signed the Dunkirk Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance. On March 17, 1948, this Treaty of Alliance included the Benelux countries and the Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense. In many ways this treaty provided a pattern for the North Atlantic Treaty. In June, 1947, General Marshall, the United States Secretary of State, announced the famous Marshall Plan for the economic rehabilitation of Europe.¹⁸ Finally, on April 4, 1949, due to Soviet expansion and aggressive diplomacy, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.¹⁹ Greece and Turkey acceded to it in 1952 and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955.²⁰ The Treaty itself was a model of clarity and brevity. Its purpose is well expressed in the Preamble:

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.²¹

This unique task of establishing an alliance between sovereign states for collective defense in time of peace, without any direct surrender of national independence, and thus, without supranational institutions, posed many problems. Gradually the political and military organization, described below, was evolved, all agencies created by

¹⁷Speech to NATO Military Committee, Washington, April 10, 1961.

¹⁸Buchan, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

¹⁹Hubertus Lowenstein, *NATO and the Defense of the West* (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 3-5.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 5.

²¹North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, D. C., April 4, 1949.

the alliance being subordinate to the North Atlantic Council, composed of the Foreign Ministers of the member countries.²² Parallel to the work of the organization, the Council was concerned with establishing a common defense policy in the fields of armaments production and military strategy.²³

Therefore, the principal instrument of decision-making in NATO is the North Atlantic Council. It is composed of representatives of all fifteen member governments. It can meet at three levels: (a) Heads of Government (as it did once, in December, 1957, or as they did January, 1965); (b) Foreign Ministers (as it usually does, twice yearly); occasionally, the council at the ministerial level brings together Defense and Finance Ministers; (c) Permanent Ambassadors (once a week, or more frequently). When the Council makes unanimous decisions, these are deemed to be binding upon all the member governments. Lord Ismay, former Secretary General of NATO, wrote:

“When governments hold divergent views, negotiation continues until unanimous agreement has been obtained. It is true that unanimity is not always achieved without considerable patience and a good deal of give and take; but it has always been reached in the end. That is because the interests and objectives of all NATO countries are fundamentally the same, and because the habit of thinking alike for the common good is growing daily.”²⁵

NATO, therefore, was established not as a supernational or federal organization, but as a defensive league of states lacking any organs of central government.²⁶ Each member guarded its sovereign prerogatives. In theory, precise distinctions can be drawn between federations, supranational organizations, confederations and mere alliances. In real life, which is always imprecise, the controversy over the differences between these types of associations is apt soon to reach a point of diminishing returns. But, in the present context, at least a rough distinction between a confederation and an alliance helps to fix the actual scope and limits of NATO. A confederation, although it does possess a central government (possibly including legislative, executive and judicial organs) or expressly delegated powers,²⁷ does not impinge on the sovereignty of its members. Members of a confederation, unlike those of most federations, reserve the right to withdraw from the compact if they wish to do so. But while they remain in it they are obligated to carry out the decisions of the central organs, so long as these act within the scope of their defined powers. Moreover, although the members of a confederation usually vote as equal states, they can

²²Buchan, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

²³Kurt Birrenbach, *The Future of the Atlantic Community* (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 21.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 60.

²⁶Henry Kissinger, “The Unsolved Problems of European Defense,” *Foreign Affairs* (July, 1962).

²⁷Francis Coker, “Sovereignty,” *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 11th printing, XIV, p. 260-268.

be considered legally bound to follow specified decisions which are taken by simple majorities.²⁸

NATO was set up as an alliance, not as a confederation. It is an intergovernmental group whose members undertake to consult, to coordinate and to cooperate. Whatever controls NATO exercises over its members, it exercises them with the approval of its members.²⁹ The NATO bodies, such as the Secretariat and the Council, can facilitate communications among governments, approve reports, render opinions, make recommendations, and address requests. But NATO, as a strictly intergovernmental body, cannot lay down binding policy guidelines, nor can it issue authoritative directives, not even in the crucial area of military defense, which is the *raison d'être* of the Alliance.³⁰ A veto is retained by each member government. All of the member governments give lip-service to the fact that an attack upon one shall be deemed an attack upon all. But final decisions are retained by each state as to what action, including military force, it shall undertake to support its treaty obligations. The architects of NATO hoped that intensive joint planning among the members (e.g., standardization of equipment, joint training exercises, combined deployment, joint war exercises, mutual exchanges of intelligence, close cooperation in the planning of national defense policies and intensive political consultation) would generate centripetal forces sufficient to offset the centrifugal tendencies which invariably plague alliances in times of crises.³¹ But in the final analysis, significant policies within NATO can be developed only through the process of diplomatic negotiation. Article IX of the Treaty, which sets up the North Atlantic Council defines neither powers nor procedures. The Council can take decisions only by unanimous consent. However, the main thing here is the fact that the stronger and more stable country has the pleasant position of more or less dictating a policy or policies, which it feels is more or less in its own interest, and the weaker and less stable members of the alliance accept it even when it is, at times, contrary to their national interests. Sir Geoffrey Crowther, former editor of *The Economist*, states:

The alliance will be expected to work in matters that the United States deems important, but not in matters that Britain and France deem important, and even perhaps vital to their existence. If this is the American attitude, and it is, then it is hard to see how there can be an effective alliance . . . I am not trying to say that the State Department must always dance to a Franco-British tune. It is obvious that the strongest member of the alliance must have the biggest say in determining its policies . . . But it is also in the logic of alliance that the permanent and vital national interests of the weaker partners

²⁸Merrill Jensen, *The New Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1950), p. 27.

²⁹Alastair Buchan, *Arms and Stability in Europe* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953), p. 142.

³⁰Carol E. Bauman, *Political Cooperation in NATO* (Wisconsin: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wisconsin, June, 1960).

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 10.

become permanent and vital interests of the United States, or the alliance will suffer.³²

During the 1950's, the ever closer team work and growing military strength of the alliance was a great political achievement. This growing intimacy of the Council's members smoothed the path of diplomatic cooperation. America, because of her powerful position in the alliance as well as in the world, invoked her unilateral policies. Yet serious problems of coalition diplomacy remained.

For example, the inability of the leading European nations of the Atlantic Alliance to devise common policies to protect their relatively remote interests in the Far East and Southeast Asia during the period 1949-54, and the U. S.' unwillingness to do so or to help them do so. Also, the crisis of confidence which confronted NATO at the time of Suez and Hungary compelled the statesmen of the Alliance to take another look at the question of political coordination. The British and French felt that they had been let down shamefully by their American ally.³³ Another example is the situation of September, 1958, when De Gaulle, in letters to both Eisenhower and Macmillan called for a creation of a closer working relationship among the three leading members of NATO.³⁴ De Gaulle appeared to be more interested in developing common strategic responsibilities outside the European territory of NATO than in acquiring a privileged voice in the determination of intra-European NATO policy.³⁵ Rene Pleven stated:

France, the only continental member of NATO which today has defense responsibilities of comparable magnitude to the British, would also like to have the means of making her voice heard.³⁶

On the same point, Furniss made the following remarks:

What France was trying to do was simply to get the United States to realize how important it is that the nations of the West stand together against the Soviet challenge and that they be so whenever and wherever that challenge is presented. The French thesis is that the surprises which the Soviet Union is adept at producing in all parts of the world may at any moment directly affect the territories of the French Community; and that in view of this, it would be both logical and useful to allow France to participate in the formulation of global defense plans . . . It wants permanent cooperation with the United States and Great Britain along these lines, whether through NATO or otherwise.³⁷

³²Geoffrey Crowther, "Reconstruction of an Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XXXV, January, 1957, pp. 180-181.

³³Susan Strange, "Strains on NATO," *The Yearbook of World Affairs 1956* (London, England: Institute of World Affairs, 1956), p. 22.

³⁴Robert Strausz-Hupe et al, *Building the Atlantic World* (New York: Harper & Row, Inc., 1963), p. 49.

³⁵*Ibid.*

³⁶Rene Pleven, France in the Atlantic Community, *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVIII (October, 1959), p. 22.

³⁷Edgar S. Furnise, Jr., "De Gaulle's France and NATO: An Interpretation," *International Organization* XV (Summer, 1961), p. 349-365.

However, this so-called "tripartite" proposal was received unfavorably by the United States' State Department. Washington had refused to share with France, or its major allies, nuclear secrets which were in the possession of the Soviet Union and which had been given to Britain,³⁸ under the McMahon Act. France resented this as well as being left out of the disarmament talks before she got a national nuclear force.

Now, we can see that France, at first a weak member, with other interests abroad, sought only equality in the decision-making structure of NATO to help her protect her other communities as well as herself. Each time she was denied or rejected. France, then, found herself having to formulate a go-along policy to protect her national interests more adequately. Thus, as I stated before, the U. S. being a strong member of this alliance, dictated policy that tended to be solely in her interest most of the time and reduced the other allies to second-rate members. Also being a member of several global defense systems the U. S. needed only to adopt a policy which suited her interest in that particular defense system and cover the other portions of her interest in her other defense systems. On the contrary, the second-rate members being unable economically, politically and militarily to join other global defense systems to cover their national interest adequately tried to do this in one alliance, in which they didn't even have equality. Therefore, a situational condition arose, as soon as those members of the Alliance were able to gain equality (i.e., by strengthening themselves politically, economically, and militarily) they endeavored to pursue policies that were in the favor of their national interests. They were no longer willing, nor in a position to have policies dictated to them. France is a leading example, while Portugal and Spain are, too, but to a lesser degree, because they have not yet gained equality. Portuguese policies began to shift after the Goa and the Santa Maria incident.³⁹

However, no other example will show this better than our forthcoming discussion of NATO's approach to multilateral control of nuclear weapons. The previous discussion of the nature of the alliance itself was to provide some background so as to make the coming discussion more meaningful.

While the major military problem confronting the West in the nuclear field is ensuring the capacity to retaliate immediately and effectively in the event of a surprise attack, the greatest political problem for the alliance is undoubtedly the political control of nuclear weapons.⁴⁰ The development of nuclear policy within NATO has evolved out of the interaction of the status quo tendency of United States preferences and the revisionist pressures emanating from Europe specifically from London, Paris, and Bonn. Until the end of 1960,

³⁸Lowenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

³⁹Sydney Gruson, "Our Policies Bother Allies," *New York Times*, February 25, 1962.

⁴⁰Frederick Mulley, "NATO's Nuclear Problems: Control or Consultation," *Orbis*, VIII (Spring, 1964), p. 21-36.

the question of the role of nuclear weapons and control over their use within the alliance had been deliberately evaded. However, no decisions were taken—except to study the problem for the next meeting of the Council in May, 1961.

Prior to 1961, the United States retained exclusive control of the nuclear weapons in NATO. American policy concerning nuclear weapons has clearly dominated the development of NATO strategy since 1949. That policy has had a quality of ambivalence, growing out of competing operational priorities and interests, all of which have been firmly based in the domestic political environment.⁴¹ These policies reflect continuing tension between the U. S. to retain exclusive control of these weapons and the desire of European governments to participate in this control or to deploy their own nuclear forces.⁴² This process of interaction has carried NATO policy away from the American unilateral control system, through a stage of “nuclear sharing,” “NATO nuclear force by co-ordination of national forces already in existence,” and finally to the creation of a “multilateral force.”⁴³ Attention is now directed toward the implementation of this multilateral force, but this raises immensely more difficult questions. This continuing controversy over nuclear control is a reflection of the vast changes in the international environment since 1949, most notably the resurgence of the nations of Western Europe, and the alliance itself. United States nuclear policy has been necessarily modified, reflecting the growth of Europe’s strength and the diffusion of nuclear weapons.

In this frame of reference, three definable policies can be identified among the issue of nuclear weapons control. The first policy: American unilateral control ranged from 1949 into a period extending through the Korean war. NATO then operated in the framework of an American nuclear dominance that could hardly be challenged. The American nuclear monopoly, shortly after this period, was ended by the Soviets, and Britain became the third nuclear power in 1952.⁴⁴

In any event, the Europe of that era was in no position to demand a share in United States’ nuclear strength as a price for alliance. Enfeebled by the war and virtually stripped of its military strength, Western Europe was too dependent on the United States for its economic recovery and defense, to contest seriously the United States’ monopoly of control. Britain was striving in these years to effect a change of policy in the direction of the early wartime arrangements for atomic energy.⁴⁵

The second policy: Nuclear sharing and bilateral controls began in 1953, after the Eisenhower Administration came into power. The United States looked out upon a vastly changed situation in nuclear weapons and international security. Britain had the bomb; the Soviet Union, no longer ruled by Stalin, was amassing formidable military

⁴¹*Ibid.*

⁴²Strausz-Hupe, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

⁴³Birrenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

⁴⁴Ronald Clark, *The Birth of the Bomb* (London: Phoenix Hours, 1961).

⁴⁵*Ibid.*

power, and the United States had successfully tested the Hydrogen Bomb. Washington then advanced a new look in defense policy which relied on "quality"—atomic weapons—rather than on "quantity"—conventional forces—as the mainstay of Western security. This idea was welcomed by European governments because they could not fulfill the ninety-division objective set forth at the 1952 NATO conference in Lisbon.

For NATO, the new look meant direct dependence on nuclear weapons, at least of the tactical variety, not only for deterrence of aggression but also in planning for actual defense against attack.

Nuclear sharing meant to the U. S. sharing of certain kinds of information, not control of weapons, and this with reference to tactical systems, not the strategic deterrent forces. This certainly did not suffice to terminate the pressures on Washington by its European allies to share in control of these weapons. This pressure finally prompted Secretary of State Dulles to announce in the summer of 1957 plans for establishing nuclear-arms stockpiles in Europe for use by NATO armies and for the sale of intermediate range missiles to Britain.⁴⁶ The President personally pointed out that such a stockpile arrangement ought to make it unnecessary for others to manufacture nuclear weapons,⁴⁷ but Paris and London saw it differently.

The dawn of the missile age, symbolized by the sputnik in the fall of 1957, caused another round of debate over control within NATO. The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) called into question the credibility of the United States' deterrent for the protection of Europeans who voiced acute concern that their dependency on the United States' nuclear monopoly might constitute what was termed "annihilation without representation." Another fear was the fact that the American nuclear weapons might not be used at all since the cities of North America would be the targets of Soviet retaliation.⁴⁸

President Eisenhower personally attended the NATO meeting in Paris at the end of 1957 to reassure the allies in the postsputnik crisis that America would come to their defense. He declared that "national self-sufficiency" was out of date, and he pushed for a broader type of nuclear sharing and for a system of bilateral controls within NATO as a new form of interdependency responsive to the new dangers of the missile era. In addition, the stockpile idea was followed through, with the nuclear warheads under United States' custody but the weapons were deployed also in accordance with NATO joint planning.⁴⁹ Britain agreed to the IRBM offer, and their missiles were placed there under a "two-key" system under which the United States and British authorization were both required to join the warhead to the missile and fire it. Jupiter IRBM's were accepted by Italy and Turkey, but France refused to accept such weapons unless they were under French

⁴⁶Jack Raymond, *The New York Times*, July 17, 1957, p. 1.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, July 18, 1957, p. 4.

⁴⁸Robert Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 220-221.

⁴⁹*The New York Times*, December 17, 1957, p. 12.

control.⁵⁰ Also the 1958 atomic-energy legislation of the U. S. did permit broadened sharing of information and also some sharing of materials, but all subject to stipulation of such a nature that Britain, already an established nuclear power, was the only nation that could derive important benefits. Washington's theory behind this was that "an artillery man does not need to know the formula for gunpowder or how to make it in order to use an artillery shell effectively,"⁵¹ but this concept did not satisfy Paris. The De Gaulle government pressed forward with its own nuclear plans and in February of 1960 exploded its first nuclear device.⁵²

The third policy: A NATO force by assignment and coordination or a multilateral deterrent (an amalgamated nuclear force) to which two or more nations contribute components and in which the weapons systems are placed under joint planning and operational control. The French bomb, and related actions and pronouncements of the French government, crystallized growing fears that nuclear proliferation⁵³ threatened the unity of the alliance and the realization that "sharing" could not deal with the problem. Finally, numerous proposals for NATO began to appear. General Lauris Norstad, NATO's military chief, called for the establishment of NATO as a fourth nuclear power.⁵⁴ At the NATO Council meeting in December of 1960, the United States advanced another proposition. Secretary of State Herter told the NATO Council that the United States would supply a force of five submarines to NATO by the end of 1963 if the European governments would work out an accord on the political control of the force and themselves arrange a contribution of one-hundred medium-range missiles to the force as a second component.⁵⁵ Herter spoke of the idea as a "concept," the British called it an "offer," and the Germans said it was a "proposal."⁵⁶ However, the French continued to improve their nuclear capability as they became progressively stronger economically and politically.

With the advent of the Berlin Crisis, the Kennedy administration had to deal very early with the problems of European defense. At Ottawa, in May of 1962, President Kennedy gave some concrete form to the idea advanced by Robert Bowie of Harvard and Christian Herter. Kennedy announced that the U. S. would assign to NATO's command a force of five nuclear submarines. The President also announced that the United States would give careful consideration to a "NATO sea-borne force, which would be truly multilateral in ownership and

⁵⁰Osgood, *op. cit.*, p. 221-223.

⁵¹U. S., Congress, Joint Commission on Atomic Energy, 86th Cong., 1st Session, 1959, p. 91.

⁵²Bertrand Goldschmidt, "The French Atomic Energy Program," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XVIII (Sept. - Oct. 1962), p. 39-42, 46-48.

⁵³Albert Wohlstetter, "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+1 Country," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1961.

⁵⁴Hanson W. Baldwin, *The New York Times*, Dec. 20, 1960.

⁵⁵Jack Raymond, *The New York Times*, Oct. 13, 1969, p. 1.

⁵⁶Hanson W. Baldwin, *The New York Times*, December 20, 1960, p. 2.

control.”⁵⁷ As a result of the Kennedy-Macmillan agreements at Nassau late in 1962 and the policies voted by the NATO Council at Ottawa in May of 1963, the concept of the NATO force had begun to take definite form.

The Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF), a concept calling for a joint NATO fleet of 25 missile-carrying cargo ships, attempts to give a greater share of nuclear sharing to her allies. The MLF mixed-manning principle and collective ownership have placed great strain on relationships with the allies as well as on the relationship with the Soviet Union.⁵⁸ The continental pressure by the United States upon her allies to accept this MLF idea has presented a critical challenge for NATO.

The real origins of the MLF plans were the fears of many Europeans that they could not rely on U. S. nuclear weapons to protect them. They believed the U. S. might sacrifice the Continent rather than risk nuclear retaliation against its own soil. Thus, they wanted their own nuclear deterrent, or at least a finger on the trigger of a joint deterrent. The U. S. response was MLM, a device that would offer greater sharing possibilities only. The dispute then between France, on one hand, and the U. S., West Germany and Britain on the other hand, over the mixed-manned nuclear force, proposed by Washington is not about ownership but about control and the major weakness of the MLF approach stems from confusing the question of physical possession of nuclear weapons with the question of control over their use. This distinction is clearly recognized in the existing national nuclear forces by procedures to ensure that it is the political head of government and not the military commanders who exercises control. Surely it cannot be intended to breach this vital principal of political control in the MLF. Thus part ownership of the “hardware” will not confer any participation in control, and conversely, it is possible to have a share in control without any ownership of the actual missiles. So far, both the nuclear weapons and the nuclear strategy of NATO have been almost exclusively provided by the United States with minor participation of the United Kingdom.⁵⁹ Now the other members of NATO, especially France, want to participate in formulating defense policy, because in World War II, France found herself defending the continent alone while the British Bomber command stayed at home. This is not the sole reason, but it is a major one: fear of abandonment in a crisis situation. Someone may refuse to act.

The prime purpose of the MLF is to head off the possibility the Federal Republic of Germany might seek to acquire her own nuclear weapons or might be tempted to take part in a joint France-German

⁵⁷Hanson W. Baldwin, *The New York Times*, May 12, 1962, p. 8.

⁵⁸Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Moscow and the MLF: Hostility and Ambivalence,” *Foreign Affairs*, XLIII (Oct. 1964), p. 126.

⁵⁹Wallace Magathan, Jr., “Western German Defense Policy, *Orbis* VIII (Summer, 1964), p. 292-301.

force.⁶⁰ It is further aimed at isolating President De Gaulle within Europe. It is only secondarily concerned with avoiding the dangers of nuclear proliferation and does not address itself to the general issue of control of all nuclear weapons within the Alliance.

The major defect of the MLF is its failure to resolve the problem of control of nuclear weapons, which is the core of all the nuclear difficulties within NATO. There is still no indication of how the command system of the MLF itself will be organized and there is a strong probability that, if the force is ever created, disputation about its control will intensify instead of reduce the friction within the Alliance. Even if an agreed and satisfactory control system can be evolved for the MLF, this will not greatly assist in the development of a control system for the other nationally commanded nuclear forces which comprise the vast majority of NATO nuclear weapons. The crucial issue is whether the U. S. could block the use of the MLF in any crisis, and still remain free to use its own nuclear arsenal.⁶¹ Therefore, a nation which has its entire nuclear force in the MLF would be severely hurt in a crisis situation. No wonder De Gaulle had described the entire device as an ingenious plan for assuring American nuclear control.⁶² Therefore, the multilateral concept seems either to entail a built-in series of vetoes by participating governments, which would make it of dubious military value, or to require the renunciation of the power to choose between war and peace on the part of some or all of the participants.⁶³

At the moment of this writing the principle of political control exercised by the alliance as a whole over the nuclear retaliatory forces has not been agreed upon, let alone the practical problems of "who, how, and when" involved in drawing up the machinery of such control.

Hence, my conclusion is that the crisis within the alliance is a situational thing and not one of personality. My conclusion is based on the fact that the countries of Europe have now regained their stability and want some voice in the policies that affect their national interests.

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⁶⁰Ronald Steel, "In Place of NATO," *New Republic* Vol. 151 (November 14, 1964), p. 20.

⁶¹*Ibid.*

⁶²Steel, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

⁶³Klaus Knorr, *A NATO Nuclear Force: The Problem of Management*, Policy Memorandum 26 (Princeton: Center of International Studies, 1963).

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Machiavelli's Theory of Religion

By Dr. Hanes Walton, Jr.

The name Machiavelli over the centuries has been associated with evil. "Machiavellism" generally implies deceit and self-interested wrongdoing, but the man Machiavelli was an extremely patriotic citizen whose intentions were honorable. In large measure his theories reflected the times in which he lived. At the time, Italy was experiencing a period of decadence. To this end, Machiavelli's advice to rulers on how to obtain power and to retain it fitted the character of the times. Machiavelli felt any means ought to be employed to preserve the State because these means were forced on the ruler by necessity.

It seems worthwhile, therefore, to ascertain what Machiavelli's thoughts were as to religion. This research was facilitated by the many indications as to his attitude toward religion which are scattered throughout his writings, particularly *The Prince* and *The Discourses*.

Statement of the theories. Machiavelli's theories with respect to religion were intimately linked to his idea of *raison d'être de l'étas*: He advocated the use of a national religion for State purposes and the choice of religion not for its supernatural validity, but for its power as a myth in unifying the masses and cementing their morale.¹ The history of the idea of *raison d'être de l'étas* in the modern world begins with Machiavelli, a heathen, a man to whom the fear of hell was unknown, and who could set about his work of analysing the essence of *raison d'étas* with all the naivete of the ancient world.²

Religion as a means of social control. Firstly, Machiavelli subordinated religion, as such, to the State. Religion became one more means of social control. Its importance lay in its ability to reinforce the political authority of the State.

. . . for there are many good laws, the importance of which is known to the sagacious lawgiver, but the reasons for which are not sufficiently evident to enable him to persuade others to submit to them; and therefore do wise men for the purpose of removing this difficulty, resort to divine authority.³

Machiavelli's thesis was that neglect of divine worship would lead to the ruination of the State.

There is no surer prognostic of impending ruin in any State than to see divine worship neglected or despised . . . The religion of all nations is founded upon some principles . . . All rulers and commonwealths ought to have a special regard to

¹Machiavelli: *The Prince and The Discourses* (New York: Random House, 1940), p. 37.

²Friedrich Meinecke, *Machiavellism*, trans. Douglas Scott (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), p. 29.

³Machiavelli, *op. cit.*, *Discourses* XI, p. 147.

the fundamental principles of the religion of their country, for whilst they are kept inviolate it will be an easy matter to maintain devotion and consequently good order and union amongst the people.⁴

Machiavelli valued religion to the extent that it assisted in obtaining these ends. Unification and preservation of Italy was his obsession. His whole political way of thought was nothing else but a continual process of thinking about *raison d'état*. His system of thought was brought into being by the coinciding (in Italy) of a political collapse with a spiritual and intellectual renaissance.⁵ Statecraft which existed during Machiavelli's day taught that everything must be considered in terms of its usefulness, all religious and moral limitations notwithstanding. Machiavelli said, "the ruler should use religion to reinforce his authority even if he himself did not believe in it."

And therefore everything that tends to favor religion (even though it were believed to be false) should be received and availed of to strengthen it; and this should be done the more, the wiser the rulers are, and the better they understand the natural course of things . . . and their authority afterwards [will give] them credence with the people.⁶

Religion as a supernatural force. Machiavelli did not believe in religion as a supernatural force. To Savonarola's claim to revelation from God, Machiavelli said, "Whether this were so I do not take it upon me to pronounce . . . but very many believed him without having any real grounds for their belief."⁷ Machiavelli did not believe that God directly ordered the affairs of men. He wrote, in "The Golden Ass," as follows:

The belief that by kneeling idly upon thy knees thou canst leave all to God has brought many kingdoms and states to ruin . . . Let no man be so senseless as to think that if his house fall he can leave it to God to save him.⁸

Machiavelli believed in a non-personal, non-interfering Deity. He believed that fortune and not God controlled the fate of mankind. He said mankind worked out its own salvation under the limits set by the laws of chance, fate, and opportunity, which sometimes undo the efforts of man.

We see everyday things happen contrary to all human expectations and that our freewill be not wholly set aside, I think it may be the case that Fortune is the ordained of one-half of our actions.⁹

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 149-50.

⁵Meinecke, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

⁶Machiavelli, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

⁷E. Erskine Muir, *Machiavelli and His Times* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1936), p. 164.

⁸"The Golden Ass" cited by D. Erskine Muir, *Machiavelli and His Times* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1936), pp. 165-66.

⁹Muir, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

“Men suffered,” Machiavelli said, “because they could not adapt themselves to changes in time and human affairs.” Therefore, they had no fortune at one time and bad fortune at another.

Religion in the Roman Empire. Machiavelli believed the maintenance of religion was one of the reasons for the great successes of the Roman Empire. He thought religion was a binding force that kept alive the loyalties of the people in the community. Machiavelli believed that when religion began to decay in Rome so did the civilization of the empire.

Machiavelli's Critics

Machiavelli found two main faults with religion and the Church. Firstly, he blamed the Church for advancing a policy detrimental to Italy. Machiavelli was greatly distressed over the temporal power the Church wielded, and felt that this was an obstacle to the unification of Italy.

The Popes, at first by virtue of their power to excommunicate and later both by this and force of arms, together with indulgences, inspired fear and veneration . . . Through the evil example of that Court the country has lost all piety and faith . . . We Italians owe this debt to the Church and the priests, that we have become irreligious and wicked; yet we owe them a greater, which is the cause of our ruin, that is, that the Church has ever kept, and keeps, our country divided.¹⁰

The Church was never strong enough to conquer the other four Italian States herself and indeed when her own temporal power was threatened called in “some foreign potentate to defend her.”¹¹

The second indictment Machiavelli leveled against the Church was that it had brought religion to disrepute and religion, he felt, was useful to the State. He was appalled at the low moral level to which the Church had sunk. All his life he had never seen the Papacy occupied by one man of even ordinary goodness and decency.¹²

At heart Machiavelli was a heathen, although the Christian view did have influence on him. He charged Christianity with having made men humble, unmanly, and feeble. He objected to the principles taught by Christianity because they did not promote his political objectives.

Reflecting now as to whence it came that in ancient times the people were more devoted to liberty than in the present, I believe that it resulted from this, that men were stronger in those days, which I believe to be attributable to the difference of education, founded upon the difference of their religion and ours. For, as our religion teaches us the truth and the true way of life, it causes us to attach less value to the honors and possessions of this world; whilst the Pagans, esteeming those things as the highest good, were more energetic and ferocious in their actions . . .

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 160.

¹³Machiavelli, *op. cit.*, pp. 284-85.

Our religion, moreover, places the supreme good in grandeur of soul, strength of body, and all such other qualities as render men formidable; and if our religion claims of us fortitude of soul, it is more to enable us to suffer than to achieve great deeds.¹³

Machiavelli, therefore, broke with the dualistic and onesidedly spiritualizing ethic of Christianity, which depreciated the natural impulses of the senses. He strove principally for a new naturalistic ethic which would follow the dictates of nature impartially and resolutely.¹⁴

Machiavelli conceived of a "virtu" which included all his real and supreme values. Though ethical qualities were embraced in it, it fundamentally intended to portray something dynamic, which nature had implanted in man—heroism and the strength for great political and warlike achievements and first and foremost, perhaps, strength for the founding and preservation of flourishing states.¹⁵ Machiavelli separated *virtu* into two categories—one original; the other derivative. He believed that *virtu* that the founder and ruler of a State had to possess was of a higher order and that the derivative *virtu* would endure only if rooted in a naturally spirited and unspoiled people.

Machiavelli retained the basic Christian distinction between good and evil. However, his *virtu* existed in a higher moral world of its own. It was the vital source of the State. Machiavelli defined the good in terms of whether the individual acted in the interest of the community as a whole. He believed the State could produce moral goodness and justice by its own constraining power—that men were driven to action by necessity. In the Christian tradition the individual can apply to a higher law than the interest of the community. In his (Machiavelli's) identification of morality with action in the interests of the community—especially the community defined in terms of a particular State—lies his greatest departure from the Christian tradition.¹⁶

Machiavelli saw a struggle between *virtu* and *fortuna*. *Virtu* forestalled bad fortune. Machiavelli said *fortuna* was malicious and, therefore *virtu* also had to be when there was no other way open. According to Meinecke, this expressed quite plainly the real spiritual origin of Machiavellism—the infamous doctrine that, in national behavior, even unclean methods are justified when it is a question of winning or helping the power which is necessary for the State.¹⁷

Virtu, *fortuna*, and *necessita* appear repeatedly in Machiavelli's writings. He believed *virtu* and *necessita* were related. *Virtu* was the vital power of men which created and maintained States, giving them meaning and authority. Machiavelli traced morality to necessity. For him, necessity was the force that brought men into the form required by *virtu*.

¹⁴Meinecke. *op. cit.*, p. 31.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶Staff of Columbia College (ed.), *Chapters in Western Civilization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), pp. 1, 145.

¹⁷Meinecke, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

Machiavelli believed good and bad times occurred in cycles and that *virtu* did not exist in the world in unlimited supply—that is passed around the world continually. Machiavelli believed that only in ancient times did a single nation—Rome—possess a preponderant supply of *virtu*. Further, he believed that it was necessary to act in accordance with the morality prevailing in the existing cycle. Machiavelli lived in a bad time. For this reason he believed public order could be achieved only in an atmosphere where the Prince was feared. It was no good longing for the existence of religious and patriotic feelings that could not in the nature of things be attained overnight.¹⁸

Critique

Machiavelli was intensely secular. He was not moved by the things that religious dreams are made of. He was a pragmatist, distinguishing between the ideal form of institutions and the pragmatic conditions under which they operate. Machiavelli created a new immorality, but he expressed the ethical consciousness of his time. Attention had shifted from God to man and greater emphasis was placed on temporal security and not eternal salvation.

Machiavelli had no belief in a spiritual life and, therefore, he stripped religion of its intrinsic value. Religion became one more technique for consolidating power in the State. He felt the State was capable of generating such morality as was necessary to promote its political ends. Machiavelli did not believe that man was destined for a supernatural end and his actions, therefore, could not be judged in terms of the divine or natural law. Mankind had to be driven into action—even to eat when hungry—according to Machiavelli.

Deeds of courage and bravery as taught by paganism were preferred by Machiavelli, and particularly as existed during the Roman Empire. He denounced Christian virtues—love, gentleness, and suffering—as sources of weakness in the State. Moreover, Christianity placed its importance on and advocated that its followers live their lives in preparation for life after death. Machiavelli was interested in this world, and particularly in restoring order to Italy.

Machiavelli was extremely nationalistic and extreme nationalism does not, or cannot, strive on such virtues. The only values that matter are greatness, power, and fame. This was especially so during the time in which Machiavelli lived and wrote. He himself said that his advice to rulers fitted the character of the times. From a practical standpoint, when there is interaction between religious morality on the one hand and political necessity on the other, it is more likely that a happy medium will be struck and excess in either direction avoided.

However, in formulating his theories, Machiavelli let himself become too influenced by his own life and his own misfortunes. Morality created by the State's constraining power, in the long run, might tend to diminish democratic freedoms. Law in itself does not make men good. Over the long run, public conscience is more effective than any number of laws.

Machiavelli erred in failing to see religion as personal and individualistic and, as such, ineffective as a tool of social control. It is an intangible force motivated from within. Religion cannot be successfully legislated. Each man is as religious as suits his own needs. Christianity recognizes a higher law than the State and, to the writer, it offers mankind a sustaining force when all else fails. For those believers who are chosen, there is always the good life awaiting them in heaven. This was certainly not true of paganism.

Machiavelli divorced politics from metaphysics and ethics, laying the basis for *Realpolitik*. He had no sympathy for humanity. His theories would leave mankind entirely without spiritual solace, alone in a godless world of nature with only the power that nature provided. This is barbaric, for then man would be in a constant struggle with the same nature from whence his powers were derived.

Modern culture has operated under a dualism since Machiavelli. On the one hand are absolute values and on the other relative values. This dualism created by Machiavelli contained its own conflict. Morality was necessary for the existence of the State as Machiavelli conceived it and at the same time morality could be dispensed with whenever national self-preservation required it.

It should be noted that ideals and ethics are important in politics as norms, not techniques. A successful statesman must keep abreast of public opinion, he must compromise, and he must make concessions. Religious reformers come into play in bringing public morale closer to an ethical norm.

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