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TOWARD A THEORY OF PROVING ONE-PARTY SYSTEMS IN AFRICA AS DEMOCRATIC: THE CASE OF TANU

Hanes Walton, Jr.

INTRODUCTION

One of the major questions posed about the political structure of the new African States today is: "How can you have democracy with a One-Party system?" The answers are many and varied, but they follow two major patterns. The two major patterns are: (1) African defenders (i.e., those who say that it is possible), and (2) the Western and non-Western critics (i.e., those who say it is not possible). Let's look briefly at these arguments.

The arguments used by African leaders to support the single-party system are based on both theoretical, pragmatic, and historical grounds.¹ Theoretically, it is claimed, that the single party represents the will of all the people. It encourages the development of a sense of personal responsibility in government by permitting mass participating in decision making. And furthermore, it is claimed that since it doesn't represent only the interest of a particular group of economic strata in the populace, it is basically more democratic than the two-party system. Madeira Keita makes the point well in his article, when he states that:

In the present historical situation in Africa there is no need to multiply parties nor to indulge in the luxury of a sterile and fratricidal opposition. Since we were agreed on the essentials and were pursuing the same objectives, was there any reason to remain divided and split into parties that rough one another?²

However, pragmatically a justification for the one-party system is derived from the view that in the crisis following independence a strong government is needed to weld the nation together.³ The needs of economic development are imperative and evident; there can be no argument about goals, the African leaders claim, therefore parties representing different points of view are superfluous.⁴ And finally, historically, it is claimed that in traditional African society politics reflected the interests of the community as a whole, that most African tribal political systems provided methods for limited popular participation in political decision-making.⁵ Few, if any African rulers, it is claimed governed

¹Rupert Emerson & Martin Kilson (ed.), *The Political Awakening of Africa*. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 105-106.

²Paul Sigmund (ed.), *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations* (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 170-82.

³Emerson, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

⁴Julius K. Nyerere, *Democracy and the Party System* (Dar es Salaam: Tanganyika Standard, Ltd., n.d.), 25-26.

⁵M. Fortes & E. Evans-Pritchard, *African Political Systems* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 8-9.

as autocrats; usually they were surrounded by councils of some type without whose consent no important decisions could be made.⁶ In many instances, formal provisions were made for an expression of popular opinion concerning the replacement of a chief, or members of his council, who transgressed tribal mores seriously. Put differently, the proponents of the single party system state that in African culture and traditions, the people sit and talk until they agree.⁷ One anthropologist commented that:

I have never found it recorded... that the Council of Elders, or clan leaders, settled important issues by formal vote, with the will of the majority prevailing. Evidently, the idea of basing a group decision on a vote is not as self-evident as we usually assume, or else it is incompatible with other values in African cultures which are more deeply entrenched.⁸

Thus, the Western two, or multi-party and Parliamentary structure is, then, as argued by the African political leaders, an essentially Western phenomenon, conforming to Western culture and traditions with no roots in African society.⁹ Taking this point further, President Nyerere stated that it was of vital importance that in a new state the institutions of government be understood by the people, if it is to encourage national unity.¹⁰

However, be that as it may, the Western critics of the one-party system in Africa have argued that instead of promoting democracy it has given rise to dictatorships which refuse to permit the formation of an opposition party.¹¹ The Western critics contend that it is impossible to have democracy without a two or multi-party system.¹² Moreover, the critics argue that in those few cases where an opposition party exists in Africa, it has been denied the opportunity to play its rightful role as the continuing critic of government policy. Therefore, some of the Western critics have been prompt to blame the growing political disorder in Africa on the single party system. They contend that the main party fails to satisfy all sectors of the populace, and that the dissatisfied, so frustrated,

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Nyerere, *op. cit.*, p. 1-2

⁸ Robert Grey, "Political Parties in New African Nations: Anthropological View," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol IV, No. 4 (July 19, 1963), pp. 451-2.

⁹ Julius Nyerere, "Democracy and the Party System," in Emerson, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-123.

¹⁰ Nyerere, *Africa Report* (July, 1962), p. 5.

¹¹ Martin Kilson, "Authoritarian and Single Party Tendencies in African Politics," *World Politics* (January, 1963), pp. 263-294. This paper isolates and analyzes five causes of single party rule in Africa.

¹² *Ibid.* See also Pendleton Herring, *The Politics of Democracy* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1940.) He makes the point that democracy cannot survive without two parties.

can only vent their grievances by overthrowing the government by force.¹³ In other words, underlying the Western critics argument is the implicit assumption that only Western-modeled systems are applicable to all societies regardless of their cultural heritage.

Hence, it can be readily seen that both observations, those of the African defenders and the Western critics, suffer from problems of objectivity, validity, weak methodology, coherent and systematic logic. Each approach is essentially normative, value orientated, and superficial. Both approaches lack a concrete methodology and some type of general theory. However, a general theory is necessary if any fundamental understanding of comparative politics is to be had. And obviously, the present justifications are not much of a step in this direction. These approaches of the African defenders and the Western critics leave the problem unsolved. This problem of the single-party system and democracy must still be investigated and approached with sound methodology, which will evolve some type of general theory to give a better understanding of the phenomenon.

The focus of this paper is on the problem of the single-party system and democracy in Africa. In this paper, I intend to construct a model which will postulate a theory to help prove that one party systems can be democratic. The paper will start with the idea of factionalism¹⁴ and attempt to evolve certain criteria whereby factions can be considered democratic. From this criteria it is hoped that a general theory embracing the concept of bifactionalism¹⁵ in single-party systems may be democratic. After the establishment of the criteria, then, I will examine and investigate the behavior of the one-party system in Tanzania (TANU) to see the relevance or the application of the criteria.¹⁶

The method used is both analytical, descriptive and theoretical. Although the conclusion of this study will speak for itself, it is hoped that this type of presentation will be both enlightening and useful.

TOWARD A THEORY OF PROVING – ONE-PARTY SYSTEMS ARE DEMOCRATIC

This theory starts with the assumption that a one-party system does not mean the absence of all party rivalry. Thus, if intra-party competition

¹³ Emerson, *op cit.*, pp. 142-147.

¹⁴ In the chapters that follow the term faction is used to mean combination, clique, or grouping of voters and political leaders who unite at a particular time in support of a candidate." Factions differ here from political parties in that parties seek all the public offices, and factions only one. See V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics: In State and Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), for a complete discussion. Chapter 14.

¹⁵ Bifactionalism is used here to designate a system in which only two candidates appear for one office, within a single-party system.

¹⁶ For insight into an earlier study of a similar nature see, Allan P. Sindler, "Bifactional Rivalry as an Alternative to Two-Party Competition in Louisiana," *American Political Science Review* (September, 1955), pp. 641-662.

takes the form of factions and these factions conform to certain general criteria, then, they may be considered democratic.¹⁷ In other words, single-party systems are not necessarily undemocratic. They can be democratic in nature. However, factionalism by itself will not necessarily create democracy but there must also exist certain preconditions for democracy to evolve in the society.

However, before we discuss the general nature and makeup of faction or what they should be composed of, it is necessary to look first at the nature of the society in general.

The nature of society is very crucial, in terms of ideology, political institutions and individual rights. In other words, the society must be considered as an open society, with a certain amount of respect for individual rights and freedoms.¹⁸ For without a number of specific conditions, including a free press, free speech, and free assembly then the system of that society is not of the nature or kind which will permit democracy.¹⁹ Therefore, the first criterion or condition is that society provide some form of safeguard for individual rights, liberties and freedoms. It also should provide some means whereby people can redress their grievances.

Next, certain conditions are necessary for a stable and effective democratic system. For if we adhere to our definitions of factions, it is possible that a single party system characterized by factionalism would be only a "congeries of transient squabbling, which fail to meet standards of permanence, cohesiveness, and responsibility" that lead to stable and effective democracy.²⁰

Therefore, one of the factors that would help in proving that single-party systems are democratic, is that factions should attempt to acquire a degree of continuity, both in name as well as in make-up of their inner core of professional leaders.²¹ It is possible that by achieving some

¹⁷ Democracy is defined here as primarily a system of government, where the people choose their representatives. directly or indirectly, how they will govern and broadly to what ends. David Spitz, *The Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1949), p. 29.

¹⁸ Harry Eckstein & David Apter (ed.), *Comparative Politics* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1963), pp. 116-119.

¹⁹S. M. Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960), p. 32.

²⁰Key, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 304. See also A. Heard, *A Two-Party South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1952), pp. 3-19.

type of continuity, the voters' support would be stabilized, and the electorate would have some way to identify the factions' general orientation and policies. For without acquiring some semblance of permanence and continuity, the electorate would become confused, there would be no record to judge it by and no continuing program. Key states that:

Discontinuity of faction both confuses the electorate and reflects a failure to organize the voters into groups of more or less like-minded citizens with somewhat similar attitudes toward public policy. Under a system of fluid factions, ...the voter's task is not simplified by the existence of continuing competing parties with fairly well recognized, general policy orientations... Factions that form and reform cannot become identified in the mind of the electorate...²²

This lack of continuity could lead to irresponsibility in the party, for without continuity no social mechanism would exist to bring the member of the faction into line behind an integrated program. And furthermore, "factional fluidity and discontinuity... can make a government susceptible to individual pressures and especially disposed toward favoritism (i.e., getting while the getting is good attitude).²³

Factions, after establishing some degree of continuity, should base their appeal on issues, rather than on personalities.²⁴ By basing their appeals on personalities -- this could lead to demagogues -- issues and problems would be clouded. Then by basing their appeal on issues, there would be much less shifting from one political alliance to another. This stability would help the voter in ascertaining the programs and issues.

Factions, then, by achieving permanence, continuity, and cohesiveness, could instill more responsibility.²⁵ Simply because in the absence of the organized political force that factions would represent, freer play is given to pressures on government officials. Legislators, for instance, when subject to rigorous discipline, are less susceptible to the inducements of lobbyists than if every legislator is out for himself. Individual pressures are likely to be more effective, however, on both legislative and administrative officials in a weak fluid factional than in a strong, permanent factional system.²⁶

Another important factor in aiding factions to become more democratic is its geographical distribution. In other words, factions should try to spread their influence over a wide geographical area and avoid localism.²⁷ This would aid the faction's strength and limit its attachment

²²Key, *op. cit.*, p. 303. See also Robert Dahl, *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 332-386.

²³Key, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 306.

²⁵*Ibid.* p. 302.

²⁶*Ibid.*

²⁷*Ibid.*

to a particular sectional interest, which relies solely upon friends and neighbors to gain popularity. By gaining wide popularity through a wide geographical appeal, this would serve to stabilize the faction's strength and increase its pulling power.

Now that we have established the general criteria whereby factions can be considered as providing an opportunity for stable and effective democracy, what then should the nature of the party be which encompasses these factions?

As stated earlier, certain preconditions must exist in society and this is also true of the political parties. Since there are different types of political parties in the single-party system in Africa,²⁸ which one is closer to our definition of democracy? In Africa, most scholars adhere to the following topology of political parties (i.e., Mass political parties and Elite or Patron political parties).²⁹ Mass political parties are defined generally as those who seek the adherence of every single individual.³⁰ Whereas, on the other hand, Elite or Patron usually seek the influential notables or patrons in the society.³¹ Examples of the former is TANU and of the latter is the Union Nigérienne des Indépendants et Sympathisants (UNIS). However, in terms of their democratic nature, Professor Schachter stated that:

Some of the mass parties encourage the growth of forces and institutions which may ultimately make possible the machinery of democratic systems familiar to us; for instance, competition for every citizen's vote by more than one organized team of candidates.³²

Continuing in her remarks, Professor Schachter has given four reasons why mass parties contribute to democracy.³³ First of all, they represent the "general will." Secondly, the prospect of democracy can be enhanced by mass parties because of their organization and procedure. In other words, "Mass parties, at their best, have developed the organization which can publicize and encourage the mass discussion of important issues."³⁴

²⁸Ruth Schachter, "Single-Party Systems in West Africa," *American Political Science Review* (June, 1961), pp. 294-301. See also Thomas Hodgkin, *African Political Parties* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1961).

²⁹Eckstein, *op. cit.*, p. 694.

³⁰*Ibid.*

³¹*Ibid.*

³²Schachter, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

³³*Ibid.*, pp. 299-302.

³⁴*Ibid.*

Thirdly, mass parties help democracy by encouraging social equality. And the fourth contribution is that they foster conditions where opposition is possible. Therefore, with these factors in mind, it can readily be seen that mass parties more so than elite parties would be one of the general preconditions for a stable and effective democracy. However, not for these reasons alone, but in addition, some other factors must prevail. Thus, in conjunction with the need for a mass party, there is also need for universal suffrage, sustained programs of action, and a institutionalized mechanism for the expression of the viewpoints from the lower levels of society.³⁵

However, this theory postulates that the party should not over encourage an unnecessary multiplication of factions. This would tend to lead to multifactionalism, or to a semblance of a multiparty system.³⁶ Or, on the other hand, it could destroy some of the stability of the system, which one is seeking to improve. This, the political leaders of the mass party must keep in mind.

~~4~~ Summarizing, therefore, this theory postulates the following criteria whereby a single-party system can be considered democratic in nature: (a) an open society, with respect for individual rights, liberties and freedoms; (b) within this open society, there should exist a mass party, with universal suffrage, a sustained program of action, and (c) limited factional grouping each characterized by some degree of permanence, continuity, cohesiveness, and responsibility.

Therefore, if these general criteria are adhered to, the theory states that the one-party system can be considered as democratic. However, flexibility is a feature of this theory in that the deviation of a given single party system from a particular aspect of the criteria is not too important, as long as the general characteristics of the theory cover the majority of the system in question. And furthermore, the dividing line between "more democratic" and "less democratic" is also not basic, since presumably democracy is not a unitary quality of a social system, but a complex of characteristics which may be ranked in many different ways.

³⁵By institutionalized mechanism for the expression of the lower-level of society viewpoints, it is meant that the government should make it possible whereby the poor man as well as the rich one could have the same chances and advantages in running for the particular office.

³⁶Key, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

Now that we have the general theory, let's turn to a study of TANU in the 1965 election.

TANU: AND THE 1965 ELECTIONS

On October 7, 1965, the Tanzania Parliament was dissolved and the electorate of Tanzania was given the opportunity of choosing their representatives within the context of a single national political movement.

The principles of this new form of democracy had been fully discussed and carefully chosen by the Commission set up by President Nyerere to report on "The Establishment of a Democratic One-Party State."³⁷ With one or two exceptions the findings of the Commission were included in the new Interim Constitution of 1965.³⁸

Their recommendations concerning the electoral system were:

that TANU should remain a mass party open to all citizens who accept its principles, (these were couched in extremely broad terms); that all aspiring candidates must submit themselves to a TANU District conference (TDC) who would record a preference vote; that the TANU National Executive Committee (NEC) would choose, two candidates for each constituency, from the preference list drawn up by the TDC's; (the party executives agreed on two candidates in order to avoid any member being elected on a minority vote); that candidates would share a common platform of campaign meetings and electoral activities organized by the TANU District Executive; that each constituency election would be supervised by an ad hoc committee composed by members from outside the constituency; finally, that the Presidential election would be by a direct affirmative vote for a single candidate. If a majority were cast against the candidate, then an alternative means must be put forward...³⁹

The election results gave rise to both a great deal of satisfaction and many shocks. The words of the President, that "those forming the Government will, of course, be placed from time to time, this is what elections are for..." turn out to be prophetic. However, it was the quick acceptance of the results, coupled with the high degree of participation by the people in the election process, which illustrated that the spirit behind the experiment had been vindicated.

Let us take a brief look at the organization and structure of TANU. TANU is divided into districts, areas and regions.⁴⁰ On the national level,

³⁷*Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One-Party State*(Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1956), p. 1.

³⁸*The Interim Constitution of Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1965), pp. 5-7.

³⁹*Presidential Commission, op. cit.*, pp. 34-35.

⁴⁰*Presidential Commission, op. cit.*, pp. 30-31

there is a National Executive Committee (NEC) which is the policy making organ of the party. Its decisions must at all times be coordinated with those of the government. In addition, the function of the NEC is to appoint the Secretary-General, Deputy Secretary-General and the National Treasurer of the party. The Vice-President is elected by the Annual Conference of TANU.⁴¹

At the Annual Conference of TANU, the delegates that are elected to attend are chosen by Annual District Conferences. At this Annual Conference of TANU, various party positions are filled including the NEC. Area Commissioners, in common with other members of TANU in the district, are eligible for election as delegates.⁴²

Also, Area Commissioners who are Area Secretaries of TANU are eligible to stand for election as Regional Chairmen of the party. The Regional Secretary of the party is also the Regional Commissioner.⁴³

In other words, TANU is organized from the top to the bottom in the following way: National Executive Committee (NEC) --- to --- Regional Secretary -- to -- Area Secretary -- to -- District Secretary, with each man at the same time holding both a political post as well as a party post (i.e., the Regional Secretary is also the Regional Commissioner, etc.).

Now let's take a brief look at the Party (TANU) in the 1965 elections. This particular election was chosen because there had been only one other election.⁴⁴ The other election, the 1960 election, was held prior to independence, less than 100,000 people voted and it was held on a restricted franchise basis.⁴⁵

Voting Districts

During 1962-5, boundaries were drawn throughout the country. One-hundred and seven (107) constituencies were created for the National Assembly.⁴⁶ During this time the District became the chief electoral unit, run by district councils. In many cases, the district boundaries were drawn to avoid purely tribal division.

Registration

The first stage in the 1965 election process was registration which is not an automatic process in Tanzania. During May it was announced that registration would begin on June 1st and close on July 31st, and only citizens who received a registration card during this period would be eligible to vote.⁴⁷ A total of 7,417 polling and registration stations were

⁴¹*Ibid.*

⁴²*Ibid.*

⁴³*Ibid.*

⁴⁴*Ibid.*

⁴⁵*Ibid.*

⁴⁶Belle Harris, "The Tanzanian Elections," *Mbioni*, Vol. II, No. 5, (special election edition). See also R. S. Morgenthau, African Elections, Tanzania's Contribution, *Africa Reports* (December, 1965), pp. 12-16.

set up. On the average, this is about one station per 400 registered voters.

It was hoped that the registration figure would reach the four million mark. All citizens (those born in Tanzania, or having at least one Tanzanian parent) over twenty-one were eligible to register and vote.

However, the actual registration of 3,175,617 fell short of expectations. This was, however, good. According to Harris, the response throughout the country was patchy and in some constituencies, poor.

Procedure for Selection of the Candidates

The selection procedure outlined in the interim constitution is a candidate must be a member of TANU, and a citizen.⁴⁸ He must submit his name to a special TANU District Conference (hereafter TDC) in the district where he wishes to stand. Then he must obtain not less than twenty-five nominations from among persons registered in the constituency.⁴⁹

Where there are more than two nominees, a meeting of the TANU Special Conference must be convened and each delegate may indicate a preference, by secret ballot, for one of the nominees. All the names together with the list of voters must be submitted to the NEC which selects two names to contest each seat. The NEC need not be bound by the preference votes of the District conferences.

ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION

Symbols

The party allowed each candidate to associate himself with a particular symbol. The National Assembly Elections Amendment Act of 1965 states:

For the purpose of enabling a candidate to assist voters to identify him when voting, a candidate shall... associate himself... with an approved symbol allotted to him by the National Executive of the Party...⁵⁰

This requirement, according to Harris, proved to be the most controversial of the new electoral proceedings, arising not out of the function but the choice of the symbols.

"The task of choosing fell upon the central committee of the Party. It took them over five hours to select two symbols, the Jembe (hoe) and Nyumba (house), which were felt to be of equal value, neither giving an unfair advantage to the holder.⁵¹

However, according to Harris, it soon became obvious that the use of the symbols was not being confined to identification. Much of the time of the campaign meetings was taken up with a discussion of the relative

⁴⁷ Harris, *op. cit.* This article in *Mbioni* (the monthly newsletter of Kivukoni College covers the 1965 Tanzania elections in detail with various charts, diagrams, election results, names of candidates by districts, and no page numbers) was acquired from the Tanzanian Embassy by the writer and will serve as the main source for this chapter.

⁴⁸ *Interim Constitution, op. cit.*, p. 6

⁴⁹ Harris, *op. cit.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

utility of one's symbol -- the Jembe on the offensive and the Nyumba on the defensive.⁵²

Again and again, these phrases were used throughout the campaign: "All wealth comes from the Jembe, "Should we as a nation sleep or wake up and dig?"⁵³ For cultural reasons, the Jembe had the advantage over the Nyumba. In terms of the election results, "of the thirteen defeated... TANU District Chairmen, ten had the House as their symbol."⁵⁴

It has been agreed upon that in the next elections, different abstract designs will be used as symbols, so as to rid the campaigns from all religious and cultural connotations.

Supervisory Committee

A supervisory committee of three men was set up to supervise elections in each constituency to ensure that both candidates were treated fairly and that religion or tribal issues stayed out of the campaign. Caution was taken to see that no member of the supervisory committee remained in his district.

Printed Material

With the start of the campaign, TANU and the electoral commission printed over two and a half million election manifestos, with a photograph and bibliographical details of each candidate. This was not enough and some manifestos, according to Harris, were of poor quality.

Distribution

"Some of the material arrived too late for the early meetings, and ran out before the last meetings. Since the NEC didn't complete its final selection of candidates until August 9th and the campaigns began on August 15th, more time was needed for adequate distributions."⁵⁵

Election Campaign

According to the National Assembly Election Amendment Act, "the District Executive Committee of the Party... shall organize the election campaign on behalf of both candidates... shall draw up a program of meetings..."⁵⁶ This Committee "shall specify in such programs the time and place of each meeting, the person who shall take the chair and order of speaking (alternating at successive meetings)... and shall accord a fair and equal opportunity to each of the candidates."⁵⁷

Campaign Speeches

In the pre-campaign period it was not clear what the candidates would find to speak about, since one effect of elections in a One-Party System is

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

to do away with open conflict over National Policy statements. Both candidates are members of TANU; both theoretically accept the agreed TANU policy; both will presumably work through the TANU hierarchy if they disagree with that policy.⁵⁸

Thus, for the most part, the candidates spent their time placing great emphasis on their symbols, local issues and personal humor.⁵⁹ Things, like accessible water supply, roads and schools were promised.

RESULTS

Main Determinants of Voting Behavior

The main results conveyed in Harris' study were: (1) that issues were locally and not nationally based ("one looked in vain for any evidence of a national platform"),⁶⁰ (2) that "the electors have in the main been consistent in choosing a candidate who, they think, will be the most *effective* representative to obtain local benefits or to remove local grievances;"⁶¹ and (3) "that the elections were absent of a religious vote (unlike some multi-religious countries the campaign was free from religious controversy)."⁶²

"The evidence therefore suggests that the three factors of education, local performance and campaign performance provided the most common determinants of voting behavior."⁶³ This in part counts for the fact that over half of the incumbents were defeated at the polls.⁶⁴

Presidential Results

In voting for the Party's choice for president, 2,303,678 electors cast 'yes' ballots for Nyerere, while 90,885 cast 'no' votes.⁶⁵ In other words, about 96% of the people voted for the president and about 4% against him.

Therefore, with these facts in mind, we can arrive at certain conclusions about the party in the 1965 election. The conclusions, based upon the Harris report, that can be drawn from this account of the 1965 Tanzanian elections are:

1. that the symbols, were treated as policy statements rather than distinguishing characteristics, with advantage going to the Jembe (hoe);
2. that the time gap between the acceptance of the new Constitution and its implementation was insufficient to give the electorate a good understanding of the new election procedure and time enough to launch a uniformly efficient campaign;

⁵⁸ *Presidential Commission, op. cit.*, pp. 5-7.

⁵⁹ *Harris, op. cit.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

3. That there existed some weaknesses in the counting and voting arrangements;
4. that the election procedure at time encouraged factors of a tribal and parochial nature which hampered cohesion;
5. that national office holders, including Ministers, whose work and reputation relied upon Ministries in the City, campaigned at a disadvantage in their localities.⁶⁶

Apart from these distinct conclusions, one can readily say that Tanzania resembles an open society, both in its outer and constitutional form.

Morgenthau also made these concluding remarks about the elections and its democratic features:

Based on universal suffrage, the elections were honestly run and offered the voters genuine choices between two rival candidates in more than a hundred single-member constituencies. Although the top dozen leaders of the party and government remained almost the same, there was a dramatic turnover in the national assembly as a whole -- a change far more sweeping than the parliamentary shifts usually encountered in multi-party systems. Barely a quarter of the incumbent members were re-elected as a result of decisions not imposed from above, but freely taken by the voters.⁶⁷

For the most part, the people in the 1965 elections seemed to have had some degree of choice in selecting their government. They also had a chance to participate, because for the most part it was based on universal suffrage.

Now let's look at the election results and the criteria for proving that one-party systems can be democratic.

THE ELECTION AND THE CRITERIA

In terms of the criteria and the 1965 elections, certain similarities and incongruities can immediately be seen. First, let's focus our attention upon the similarities.

The similarities stem from consistencies in terms of harmony with the first principle, that of an open society. The criteria postulates a need for an open society with certain respect for individual rights, and freedoms. Tanzania seems to comply in all forms, including the basic provisions inherent both in the Country's Constitution and that of the party. Each Constitution makes amends for individual rights. However, practice sometimes denies theory, in that student riots occurred in October, 1967. But by and large, there were available channels to quickly redress their grievances. The focus here, however, is not so much the conditions in society, but the conduct of the party in the elections, as well as whether or not this political behavior can be considered democratic in nature.

Secondly, the criteria postulates the need for a mass party, universal suffrage, and a sustained program of action. Again, Tanzania seems to

⁶⁷Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

conform, in that TANU is a mass party with membership open to all who will apply. During the 1965 elections, "all persons twenty-one and over could participate," without much trouble.⁶⁸ In other words, in principle the concept of universal suffrage seems to stand. However, in terms of a sustained program of action, some questions can be raised. In terms of this concept, there seems to be more inconsistency than consistency. However, we shall discuss this point later.

Thirdly, the criteria ascribe great weight to the fact that there should be limited factional grouping, each characterized by some degree of permanence, continuity, cohesiveness, and responsibility. Similarities exist here between the criteria and TANU in that bifactionalism is a policy of the party.⁶⁹ This is more than the criteria asked for, but in terms of the general outlines of the criteria, bifactionalism is a laudable feature of TANU. By making it a policy that two candidates avail themselves for each office, these two chosen from the total number seeking the office, TANU has sought to inject a degree of permanency and stability into their factional grouping. This is further enhanced to some extent by the use of separate symbols for each candidate. For the most part, the similarities end with these features and the inconsistencies begin to appear.

The inconsistencies stem from the fact that the criteria asked for a sustained action program. This was missing in Tanzania. TANU had no national platform, no national issues enter into the realm of the 1965 elections. In fact, as stated previously, only local issues prevailed in this election. There were no policy statements as to the national goals and national issues. However, the reason for this might be that this was the first national election in Tanzania and not enough time had elapsed to formulate such things. Secondly, it could be said that in connection with the temporal elements, that the political leadership has not properly determined what is needed and what should be done.

Another item that might be characterized as missing rather than as being inconsistent is that of the cohesiveness and responsibility of the factions. Here again, time is an important factor. Also there is no way of determining, just from one election, how cohesive a faction might be or how responsible it is to its constituency. This takes time and many elections. The party must be developed to a greater extent, symbols must take time to develop in people's minds and they must be able to associate their progress with the continual election of that symbol to office. In other words, due to the small length of time that has elapsed, and the small number of elections that have been held in the country, it is impossible to tell at this time whether the model is relevant to the situation.

In terms of continuity, which the criteria postulated as necessary in a single-party system characterized by factionalism, there is simply no way of telling, simply because of the small number of elections and the

⁶⁸See pages 16 and 17 of this paper and Harris, *op. cit.*

⁶⁹See pages 10 and 11 of this paper.

agreement to discontinue the present symbols because of the disadvantages of one of them. There is no clear means of association.

Another striking feature is that of the Government assuming all financial responsibility for each candidate's campaign but failing to fully supervise them, thus permitting the more affluent candidate to campaign privately is not good. However, here again the temporal element enters; this was the first national election, and the way to run it was not clear in the minds of the officials.

Several other factors appeared during the elections, that were neither consistent or inconsistent with the criteria, but nevertheless important. They were the uniformity of the demands made, the lack of divergent interests, and the right to vote for or against the President. If more votes are cast against the President than for him, then the Party will put up another choice. Also, the demands that arose during the election arose out of the local economic and social conditions and reflected the prevailing aspirations of the electorate.

Thus, there were some things in the 1965 elections which appeared less democratic; the selection of candidates by the NEC, the picking of candidates who in the view of the district offices that would be most qualified could lead to corruption and nepotism, but no system is without its weaknesses.

Summarizing, then, the present system is an experiment; its aim was to democratize a de-facto One-Party System, where intra-party rivalry was given a chance to disagree but it had to work within the party structure and organization. Under this system the electorate found that they were not forfeiting their right to vote because they were not presented with a single list of pre-chosen party candidates. An alternative did exist, the candidates were of their choice to some extent, and the issues were of a local nature.

All the evidence collected suggests that this new political experiment was a success in achieving its aims. The next stage is to see if the One-Party System adapts itself to change as the society moves from a more homogeneous one to a less homogeneous one.

Concluding; therefore, similarities between TANU and the criteria do exist. But on the other hand, certain inconsistencies also exist between TANU and the criteria. Moreover, other factors, not postulated by the criteria, also exist -- some acting to bolster the criteria, others to detract from it. Thus, in general, what conclusion can be drawn?

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summarizing, therefore, about the criteria and reality, certain things can clearly be seen. The criteria attempt to postulate a theory for proving that single-party systems can be democratic. This theory was put forth with certain criteria. Then, a study was made of the Tanzanian Elections of 1965. Next, a comparison was made between the criteria and the Tanzanian Elections, in which TANU was the main party with two major and permanent factions. At several junctures, the model and TANU, were similar. At other points, they varied and at other points, there were no connections.

In cases where disagreement arises, time, the number of elections and the lack of information play major parts. In areas, where both the criteria and TANU make no meaningful connection, those broad and general aspects which seem to readily add to the stability and effectiveness of the government, are implied by the criteria. In the other realms, it was thought that these elements were not important enough to be included in the assumptions. Thus, the criteria by its very nature emphasized certain things and played down others in order to make a point and stress other essential ones. But inherent in its general nature was flexibility.

Therefore, from the basic and tentative information at hand, TANU, in terms of the criteria, can be considered for the time being as a democratic party, during the 1965 elections. Now, whether the democratic nature of the party changes or the criteria requires continual structural changes itself remains only a problem for time and the improvement of methodology in the social sciences in general.